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"OTHER ACTS" & CHARACTER EVIDENCE: PART II 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard W Weatherhead 
Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
This is the second of a two-part article on "other acts" 
evidence and character evidence. The first article exam-
ined the conditions under which an accused may 
introduce evidence of his good character and how such 
character may ~e proved (e.g., reputation or opinion 
evidence). That article also examined the prosecution 
right to rebut such evidence, either on cross-examination 
or by calling its own character witnesses. 
This article discusses when evidence of a victim's 
character is admissible. In addition, the admission of 
"other acts" evidence is examined. 
CHARACTER OF THE VICTIM 
A second exception to the general prohibition against 
the admissibility of character evidence is recognized in 
Rule 404(A)(2). That provision permits an accused to 
present evidence of a pertinent character trait of the 
alleged victim of the charged offense. 
Once the accused has introduced such evidence, the 
prosecution may offer rebuttal evidence. The prosecution, 
however, is prohibited from introducing evidence of the 
victim's character until the defense "opens the door." See 
State v. White, 15 Ohio St.2d 146, 150-51, 239 N£2d 65, 
69-70 (1968); Reed v. State, 98 Ohio St. 279, 120 N.E. 701 
(1918); Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 (1882); State 
v. Schmidt, 65 Ohio App.2d 239, 417 N.E.2d 1264 (1979). 
Rule 405(A) limits the methods of proof that the 
accused and the prosecution may use to show or to rebut 
the character of a victim; only reputation or opinion 
evidence is permitted. 
A victim's character may be relevant in two types of 
cases: on the issue of se.lf-defense in homicide and 
assault cases and on the issue of consent in rape and 
gross sexual imposition cases. In the latter cases, the 
Ohio Rape Shield law controls. See R.C. 2907.02(0); 
2907.05(0). 
Seif-Defense Cases 
Rule 404(A)(2) will be applicable principally on the 
issue of self-defense. For example, a homi9ide defendant 
could introduce evidence of the victim's violent and 
aggressive character to show that the victim was the first 
>ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
aggressor, thereby establishing one element of self-
defense. Once evidence of the victim's character is 
introduced by the accused, the prosecution may 
introduce rebuttal evidence of the victim's character for 
peacefulness. 
The prosecution's right to introduce evidence of the 
victim's character, however, is not limited to cases in 
which the defendant introduces evidence of the victim's 
character. Any evidence that the victim was the first 
aggressor in a homicide case triggers the prosecution's 
right to introduce evidence of the victim's peaceful 
character. Tlius, if the accused testifies that the victim 
was the first aggressor, but does not introduce character 
evidence on this issue, the prosecution may neverthe-
less introduce evidence of the victim's peaceful character 
in rebuttal. 
Victim's Character Affecting Defendant's State of Mind 
Evidence of the victim's violent character may also be 
relevant in a self-defense case to show that the accused 
reasonably believed that he was in danger of death or 
grievous bodily injury (an element of self-defense that is 
different from the first ·aggressor issue). This situation, 
however, does not involve the circumstantial use of 
character to prove the conduct of the victim, but rather 
involves proof of the defendant's state of mind, and thus 
is not controlled by Rules 404 and 405. 
Most of the Ohio cases have involved this issue. See 
McGaw v. State, 123 Ohio Si. 196, 174 N.E. 741 (1931); 
State v. Roderick, 77 Ohio St. 301, 82 N.E. 1082 (1907); 
Upthegrove v. State, 37 Ohio St. 662 (1882); Marts v. 
State, 26 Ohio St. 162 (1875); State v. Carlson, 31 Ohio 
App.3d 72, 73, 508 N.E.2d 999, 1000 (1986). 
If character evidence is introduced to show its effect on 
the accused's state of mind, its relevance obviously 
depends on whether the accused knew of the victim's 
violent character. In contrast, if character evidence is 
introduced to show that the victim acted in conformity 
with that violent character and was therefore the first 
aggressor, it is irrelevant whether the accused was aware 
of the victim's character. See State v. Debo, 8 Ohio 
App.2d 325, 222 N.E.2d 656 (1966). See also Ohio Jury 
Instructions§ 411.31 and 411.33 (self-defense). 
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RapeShi~ICI Law 
Under the common law, an accused in a rape case 
< c_o_uld introduceevidenGe of the victim's character for 
chastity to prove consent. See McDermott v. State, 13 
Ohio St. 332 (1862); McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 
(1858). Thisrule rested on the assumption that a woman 
who has cons.ented to premarital or extramarital inter-
course was more likely to consent than a woman who 
had not consented to such past intercourse. 
In recent years this assumption, along with other 
aspects of rape prosecutions, lias been severely criti-
cized. Most states,- including Ohio,.have responded to 
this criticism by enacting "shield" laws which limit the 
admissibility of evidenc~ ofJhe victim's character. See 
Annat.; 94 A.L,R,3d 257 (1979); §15 A.L.R.3d 1181 (1979). 
FtC. ~~-01.02(D) provic:lfis)li~fill rape cases: 
· Evidence of specific ·instances ofthe victim's sexual 
activity, opinion evidence ofthe victim's sexual activity, 
and reputation evidE:mce of the victim's sexual activity. 
shall not be admitted under this section unless it 
invoi\ieseviderrce'ott.He-origin 6fsemen, pregnancy, 
or disease; orthevictim~s past sexual activity with the· 
offender, and only to the extent that the court finds that 
the evidence is material td a fact at issue in the case 
and that its inflammatory or prejudici;:d nature does not 
outweigh its probative value, 
A similanule relating to the defendant's prior sexual 
activity is also contained irrthis provision. R.C. 2907.02(E) 
provides for a pretrial in~chambers resolution of issues 
thatarise unde-r tflis statute. 
The rape shield law is designed to protect several 
interests: 
··· "Fifsftoy~gii~rdingltfefeeijlplainant's sexual-privacy 
and proteQting h~r frorn undueharassment, the law 
· diseot~ragel) the<tendencyin~rape'cases to try the 
· victim rather than the defendant. In line with this, the 
·la.w may encourage the-reporting of rape, thus aiding 
crime prevention. Finally, by excluding evidence that is 
unduly inflammatory and prejudicial, while being only 
marginally probative, thE) statute is intended to aid in 
the truth-finding process. State-v. Gardner, 59 Ohio 
St.2d 14, 17-18, 391 N.E.2d 3~7, ~40 (1979). 
Thestah.itednters in:two.respectsfrom the general 
treatment of character,evidence under the R.ules of 
Evidence. First, the statute allows consideration of 
character evidence only insofar as it relates to sexual 
activity.betweentheNictirn:anddefendant; Rule 404(A)(2) 
contains no such limitation. Second; the statute permits 
specific instances of conduct to be introduced; Rule 
405(A)ILf11i!l?Jhe methods of proof to reputation and 
opinion evidence. 
Constitutionality of Rape Shield law 
The constitutionality of rape shield laws that preclude 
a defendant from introducing arguably exculpatory 
evidence has been questioned. Two U.S. Supreme Court 
cases, Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974), and Chambers 
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), are usually cited in 
support of the defendant's right to introduce evidence of 
the victim's character, at least in some circumstances. 
In Davis v. Alaska the Court held that a state statute 
excluding evidence of a juvenile adjudication (a type of 
shield law) violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
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~lght ofconfrontation urider the circumstances of that 
case. In Chambers v. Mississippi the Court held that the 
application of state evidentiary rules which precluded the 
defendant from introducing critical and reliable defense 
evidence violated due process. 
Congress recognized the force of the constitutional 
argument in enacting a federal shield law. Federal Rule 
412 explicitly recognizes that the admissibility of 
evidence of the victim's sexual activity may be "constitu-
tionally required." Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1). See also 22 
Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 
424;22(l9Z8); 23}d. §§_5_381-93 (1980). 
See generally Galvin,Shielding Rape Victims in the 
State and Federal Courts: A Proposal for the Second 
Decade, 70 Minn. L. Rev. 763 (1986); Tanford & Bocchino, 
Rape Victim Shield_ L,aws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 544 (1980); Berger, Man's Trial, Woman's 
Tribulation: Rape Cases in the Courtroom, 77 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1 (1977). · · 
In State v. Gardner, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court 
upheld the constitutionality of the Ohio statute as applied 
in that case. The .Court, however, left open the possibility 
that application of the statute might be unconstitutional 
under different factual circumstances. /d. at 19 n. 5. In 
State v. Graham, 58 Ohio St.2d 350, 390 N.E.2d 805 
(1979), the Court was not presented with the constitution-
al issue. Because the defendant in Graham did not assert 
"the defense of consent, which could well affect the 
materiality ~nd relevancy ofthe disputed evidence," 
evidence of the victim's prior sexual activity was not rele-
vant/d. at 352. See also State v. Thompson, 66 Ohio 
St.2d 496, 422N.E.2d 855 (1981); State v. Collins, 60 
Ohio App.2d 116, 396 N.E.2d 221 (1977). 
In State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 33, 487 N.E.2d 560 
(1986), theC::()IJQCOI}~icj~red the constitutional issue. The 
alleged victim in Williams testified that she was "gay" 
and thus would not have consented to sexual intercourse 
with a man. The defendant claimed that the alleged 
victim had consented. He also claimed that she was a 
prostitute and that they had had sexual intercourse on 
numerous previous occasions. In support of these 
claims, the defense attempted to call a witness to testify 
about the victim's reputation as a prostitute and another 
witness who claimed to have had sex with the victim. The 
trial court excluded,- based on the shield law, the testimony 
of both witnesses. 
On review; the Ohio Supreme Court agreed that the 
evidence was not admissible under the rape shield law. 
The Court, however, found that "the rape shield law as 
applied in this case violates appellee's Sixth Amendment 
right of confrontation." State v. Williams, 21 Ohio St.3d 
33, 36, 487 N.E.2d 560 (1986). Unlike its prior cases, 
which involved the use of the victim's prior sexual 
conduct as impeachment evidence, the conduct in 
Williams was relevant to consent, an essential element of 
the charged offense and the one that the prosecution 
first raised through the testimony of the victim. 
False Accusations of Rape 
In State v. Boggs, 63 Ohio St.3d 418, 588 N.E.2d 813 
(1992), the defendant was precluded from cross-
examining an alleged rape victim about a prior false 
accusation of rape. The trial judge ruled that the question 
violated the rape shield law. The Supreme Court, however, 
disagreed. The Court ruled that "[f]alse accusations, 
where no sexual activity is involved, do notfall within the 
rape shield statute." /d. at 421. Instead, this line of ques~ 
tioning involves impeachment by prior bad acts that 
reflect upon credibility. Rule 608(B), which governs this 
issue, permits inquiry on cross-examination but 
orecludes extrinsic evidence. Moreover, the defense 
#ould have to establish that the accusation was false. If, 
however, the prior accusation involved sexual activity, the 
·ape shield law would prohibit this line. of questioning. 
fhe Court summarized its holding as follows: 
Therefore, we hold that before cross-examination of a 
rape victim as to prior false rape accusations may 
proceed, the trial judge shall hold an in camera hear-
ing to ascertain whether such testimony involves 
sexual activity and thus is inadmissible under R.C. 
2907.02(0), or totally unfounded and admissible for 
impeachment of the victim. It is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court, pursuant to Evid. R. 
608(8), whether to allow such cross-examination. /d. 
at 424. 
)anctions 
In Michigan v. Lucas, 111 S.Ct. 1743 (1991), the U.S. 
)upreme Court ruled that the exclusion of defense 
1vidence for failing to comply with the notice provision of 
1 rape shield statute was not per se unconstitutional. The 
~ourt indicated, however, that exclusion in a particular 
:ase might be unconstitutional. /d. at 1747. 
"OTHER ACTS" EVIDENCE 
Rule 404(B) provides that evidence of other crimes, 
vrongs, or acts, although not admissible to prove charac-
er, may be admissible for some other purpose, such as 
1roof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
nowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
In effect} Rule 404(B) is a clarification provision. Rule 
04(A) prohibits only the circumstantial use of character 
vidence. When evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 
cts is not offered to prove that a person (typically a 
riminal defendant) acted in conformity with a pertinent 
haracter trait, the prohibition of Rule 404(A) does not 
pply. For example, if a person steals a gun and later 
ses that weapon to commit a murder, the theft may be 
3levant in the homicide prosecution to show the identity 
f the murderer. Thus, although evidence of the theft 
1cidentally shows larcenous character, it is not being 
ffered for that purpose, and Rule 404(A) does not 
rohibit its admission. See State v. Watson, 28 Ohio 
t.2d 15, 275 N.E.2d 153 (1971). 
imilar Acts Statute 
Rule 404(B) supersedes R.C. 2945.59, which is known 
s the "similar acts" statute. The rule and statute differ in 
everal respects. First, the statute applies only to acts of 
defendant in a criminal case. In contrast, the rule 
pplies in both civil and criminal cases and to the acts of 
ny person, not only those of an accused. 
Second, the rule and statute do not contain the same 
~rminology. The terms "intent," "motive," "plan," and 
~bsence of mistake or accident" appear in both. The 
1rms "opportunity," "preparation," "knowledge," and 
dentity" appear in the rule, but not the statute. The stat-
te, however, has been interpreted to include "identity." 
3 
See State v. Shedrick, 59 Ohio St.3d 146, 150, 152 N.E.2d 
59, 64 (1991); State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66,330 
N.E.2d 720 (1975). The terms "scheme" and "system" 
appear only in the statute. These differences are not critical 
because the "purposes" listed in Rule 404(B) are illustra-
tive, not exclusive. See Staff Note ("non-exclusive listing"). 
Preliminary Issues 
Several prelimrnary points deserve attention. The 
terms "similar act" or "prior crime" are frequently used 
to describe the subject matter of Rule 404(B); these 
terms are misleading. 
Noncriminal Acts 
First, the rule, by its own terms, is not limited to crimes; 
it embraces "wrongs" and "acts" as well. 
Subsequent Acts 
Second, the "other act" need not have occurred prior 
to the charged offense; evidence of a subsequent act 
may be admissible. See State v. Wilson, 8 Ohio App.3d 
216, 219, 456 N.E.2d 1287, 1291 (1982); United States v. 
Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1388 (8th Cir. 1981), cert denied, 459 
U.S. 1111, (1983); United States v. Childs, 598 F.2d 169, 
170, 171 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v. Bridwell, 583 
F.2d 1135, 1140 (10th Cir. 1978). 
Similar Acts 
In addition, the other act need not be "similar." For 
example, in the theft-of-a-gun example above, the other 
act (theft) was not similar to the charged offense (homicide). 
Offered by the Defense 
Because the overwhelming number of cases involve 
"other acts" of a criminal defendant, the following discus-
sion will focus on those cases. Nevertheless, an accused 
may also introduce evidence of "other acts." United States 
v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir. 1984). 
Notice 
Because evidence of other acts entails a significant 
risk of unfair prejudice, care must be exercised in analyz-
ing problems under Rule 404(B). One court has recom-
mended: 
Where the state seeks to use evidence of collateral 
crimes in its case in chief, it would be prudent (if not 
mandated by the due process requirement of advance 
notice) to give the defense specific adequate pre-trial 
notice and to advise the trial court to screen the 
evidence in the absence of the jury. The trial court 
should "pin down" the prosecution as to whether or 
not the evidence is limited purpose evidence and 
force the state to declare precisely what specific 
purpose the evidence is claimed to serve. State v. 
Smith, 59 Ohio App.2d 194, 199, 392 N.E.2d 1264, 
1268 (1977). 
In 1991 Fed. R. Evid. 404(b) was amended to include a 
notice provision. its purpose is to eliminate surprise and 
promote early and thoughtful resolution of the issue rath-
er than risk haphazard and erroneous admission of such 
evidence. As Justice Brennan has remarked: "Only 
pretrial disclosure of such evidence will allow the · 
defense adequate opportunity to investigate the claim of 
misconduct and to prepare objections to admission." 
Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or 
Quest tor Truth? A Progress Report, 68 Wash. U.L.Q. 1, 12 
(1990). See a/so lmwinkelried, The Worst Surprise of All: 
No Right to Pretrial Discovery of Prosecution's Uncharged 
Misconduct Evidence, 56 Ford. L. Rev. 247 (1987). 
Several~tatejurisdictions also require notice in this con-
text. See Minn. R. Grim. P. 706; Fla. Stat. 90.404(2)(b)(1); 
Tex. R. 404(b). 
Rule of Construction 
The Supreme Court has often advised caution in this 
area.Jn State v. Burson, 38 Ohio St.2d 157, 311 N.E.2d 
526 (1974), the Court stated that "R.C. 2945.59 must be 
strictly construed against the state." /d. at 158. In State v. 
Broom, 40 Ohio St.3d 277, 533 N.E.2d 682(1988),~cert. 
deni~d. 490 U.S. 1075 (1989), the Court wrote: "Because 
R.C: 2945.59 and Evid R 404(B) codify an exception to 
the common law with respect to evidence of other acts of 
wrongdoing, they must be construed against admissibility, 
and the standard for determining admissibility of such 
evidence is strict." /d. (syllabus, para. 1). Accorq State v. 
Coleman, 45 Ohio St.3d 298, 299 544 N.E.2d 622 (1989), 
· cert. denied 493 U.S. 1051 (1990). 
Rule403 
Rule 404(B) provides only that evidence of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts may be admissible; admission is not 
mandatory. The rule, however, provides no standard for 
deciding when such evidence may be admitted. Since 
admission in this· instance involves questions of rele-
vance, Rules 401 to 403 are the controlling provisions. 
These provisions, however, must be read in conjunc-
tion with prior Ohio cases. Rule 102 provides that the 
Rules of Evidence "shall be construed to state the . 
ccHTltnon law of Ohio unless the rule clearly indicates that 
a'Cifange wasintended .... " The Staff Note to Rule 404 
indicates that no change was intended. Rules 401 to 403, 
read in light of the prior Ohio cases, seem to limit admis-
sibility of evidence of other acts to instances where the 
prosecution can establish that (1) the evidence is proba-
tive of a consequential or material fact; (2) such conse-
quential or material fact is a disputed issue in the case; 
and (3) the probative value of the evidence substantially 
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice. 
Consequential (material) Facts 
As an initial matter, "other acts" evidenc~ must tend to 
prove a material or consequential fact. See Rule 401; 
State v. Gardner, 59 Ohio St.2d 14, 20, 391 N.E.2d 337, 
341 (1979) ("Our task is to determine first, whether any of 
the elements mentioned in the statute were material to 
the issue at trial, and if so, whether the disputed testimony 
was relevant, as tending to prove a material element."). 
Facts which tend to prove essential elements of the 
charged offense are always material. Some of the 
"purposes" specified in Rule 404(B), such as identity, 
intent, and knowledge, name essential elements of 
crimes; thus, evidence relevant to one of these purposes 
is usually material. Other "purposes" listed in the rule, 
however, are not typically elements of crimes. For exam-
ple, motive, opportunity, and plan are rarely essential 
elements. If the "other acts" evidence is offered for one 
of these purposes, the prosecutor must establish a rela-
tionship between the "purpose" and an essential 
element of the charged offense. Proof of motive, for 
instance, may be relevant to show identity or some mens 
rea element such as intent or purpose; that is, it is more 
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likely that a person with a motive committed a homicide 
than a person without a motive (identity issue), and it is 
more likely that a person with a motive acted purposely in 
causing a death than a person without a motive (mens 
rea issue). . 
Thus, the first step in determining admissibility under 
Rule 404(B) is hot to identify which purpose listed in Rule 
404(B) the evidence is offered to prove, but rather to 
identify which element of the charged offense the "other 
acts" evidence is offered to prove. Typically, "other acts" 
evidence is admitted as proof of one of three essential 
elements~(1H!)oshow4hat the accused was the actor 
(identity issue); (2) to show that the accused possessed 
the requisite mental state (mens rea issue); or (3) to show 
that a crime was. committed (corpus delicti). See 22 
Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 460 
(1979). 
Relevancy 
As discussed above, evidence of "other acts" must be 
relevant to a material or consequential fact. Rule 401 
defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any 
tendency to make the existence of any" consequential or 
material fact "more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence." 
Identity 
The identity of the person who committed the charged 
offense is always an essential element, and therefore 
always constitutes a material fact. "Other acts" evidence 
may show identity in a number of ways. For example, evi-
dence that the defendant participated in a prior robbery 
in which a weapon was stolen would be relevant to prove 
the identity of the murderer in a homicide case in which 
the same weapon was used. See State V; Watson, 28 
Ohio St2d 15; 275'N~E2d 153 (1971). Several of the 
"purposes" specified in Rule 404(B), such as motive, 
opportunity, or preparation may be relevant to the issue 
of identity. 
Evidence of similarity between the "other act" and the 
crime charged is frequently offered to prove identity; i.e., 
the modus operandi of both crimes is so similar that the 
same person must have committed both offenses. The 
commission of two robberies with a weapon, however, 
would not satisfy theminimum relevancy standard of 
Rule 40i and would thus not be admissible. According to 
McCormick, ''the mere repeated commission of crimes 
of the same class., such as repeated burglaries or thefts" 
is insufficient. "The pattern and characteristics of the 
crimes used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be 
like a signature." C. McCormick, Evidence§ 190, at 560 
(3d ed. 1984). 
See also State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.3d 137, 142, 551 
N.E.2d 190, 195 (1990) ("evidence of 'other acts' to prove 
· ... the identity of the perpetrator is admissible where two 
deaths occur under almost identical circumstances.'); 
State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 66, 73, 330 N.E.2d 720, 726 
(1975) ("similar crimes within a period of time reasonably 
near to the offense on trial, [and] that a similar scheme, 
plan or system was utilized to commit both the offense at 
issue and the other crimes.'); State v. Hector, 19 Ohio 
St.2d 167, 177, 249 N.E.2d 912, 918 (1969) ("There must 
be some similarity of methodology employed which itself 
would constitute probative evidence of the probability 
that the same person ... committed both crimes ... .'); 
State v. Hall, 57 Ohio Ap,p.3d 144, 148, 567 N.E.2d 305, 
309 (1989} (other act "not sufficiently distinctive to 
demonstrate the identity of the perpetrator"), overruled 
on other grounds, 42 Ohio St.3d 714, 538 N.E.2d 1065 
(1989); State v. Smith, 59 Ohio App.2d 194, 202,392 
N.E.2d 1264, 1269 (1977} ("There was no uniformity in 
the time of day of the other acts, the method of entry, or 
the items taken."). 
Intent and Knowledge 
Intent and knowledge are frequently mens rea elements 
of crimes, and evidence of other acts may be relevant to 
prove these elements. Motive and preparation may also 
relate to these elements. For example, a defendant's illicit 
affair with a homicide victim's wife is an "other act" which 
tends to show motive, and a person with a motive to kill is 
more likely to have intentionally killed than a person With-
out a motive. 
Similarly, evidence that the defendant stole a gun the 
day before a homicide may show preparation, and thus 
be relevant to the issue of calculation and design in an 
aggravated homicide case. See State v. Smith, 49 Ohio 
St.3d 137, 142, 551 N.E.2d 190, 195 (1990) ("evidence of 
'other acts' to prove intent to commit a crime"); State v. 
Greer, 66 Ohio St:2d 139, 420 N.E.2d 982 (1981);State v. 
Gardner, 59 OhioSt.2d 14, 391 N.E.2d 337 (1979); State 
v. Flonnory, 31 Ohio St.2d 124, 285 N.E.2d 726 (1972}; 
State v. Moore, 149 Ohio St. 226, 78 N.E.2d 365 (1948). 
Absence of Mistake orAccident 
Absence of mistake or accident also relates to mens 
rea. See State v. Snowden, 49 Ohio App.2d 7, 12, 359 
N.E.2d 87,91 (1976) ('''absence of mistake or accident .. .' 
is not a separate category but merely a converse ofthe 
existence of specific intent.''); Ohio Jury Instructions § 
411.01. For example, a defendant charged with aggravated 
murder who testifies that the weapon discharged by acCi-
dent when he was handling it and that he was unfamiliar 
with weapons is raising a defense of accident. Such 
evidence tends to negate the mens reaelemE!nt of pur-
posefulness. In order to rebut this evidence of lack of 
intent, the prosecution may introduce evidence that the 
defendant used a weapon during the course of a prior 
robbery. Evidence of absence of mistake or accident is 
typically admitted in rebuttal rather than in the prosecu-
tion's case-in~chief./d. at 15-16. 
In State v. Burson; 3a Ohio St.2d 157, 311 N.E.2d 526 
(1974), the Supreme Court commented: 
The other acts of the defendant must have such a 
temporal, modal and situationai relationship with the 
acts constituting the crime charged that evidence of 
the other acts discloses purposeful action in the com-
mission of the offense in question. The evidence is 
then admissible to the extent it may be relevant in 
showing the defendant acted in the absence of 
mistake or accident. !d. at 159 (emphasis added). 
Interrelated Acts 
In some cases it is impossible to exclude evidence of 
other acts that are interwoven with a charged offense 
even though such acts are not material to an essential 
element of that offense. In State v. Curry, 43 Ohio St.2d 
66,330 N.E.2d 720 (1975), the Supreme Court recog-
nized that there are some 
situations in which the "other acts" form part of the 
immediate background of the alleged act which forms 
5 
the foundation of the crime charged in the indictment. 
In such cases, it would be virtually impossible to prove 
that the accused committed the crime charged with-
. out also introducing evidence of the other acts. To be 
admissible ... the "other acts" testimony must concern 
events which are inextricably related to the alleged 
criminal act ... /d. at 73. 
This situation is sometimes described as evidence of 
"res gestae." See State v. Spears, 58 Ohio App.2d 11, 387 
N.E.2d 648 (1978). 
Defendant's Involvement in the Other Act 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is admissible 
only if such evidence is relevant to a material or conse-
quential fact (Rule 401). At a minimum, the prosecution 
must establish that the defendant committed the other 
act. Otherwise, the evidence is not relevant. 
Some courts have required "substantial proof" or 
"clear and convincing evidence" of the defendant's 
involvement in the other act. C. McCormick, Evidence § 
190, at 564 (3d ed. 1984). The Ohio cases have used the 
"substantial proof" standard. See State v. Shedrick, 59 
Ohio St.3d 146, 15.0, 572 N.E.2d 59, 64 (1991); State v. 
Jamison, 49 Ohio St.3d 182, 187, 552 N.E.2d 180, 185 
(1990) ("Other-acts evidence need be proved only by 
substantial proof, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt."), 
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 228 (1990); State v. Dick, 27 Ohio 
St.2d 162, 271 N.E.2d 797 (1971); State v. Carter, 26 Ohio 
St.2d 79, 269 N.E.2d 115 (1971). 
In Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988), 
the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the common law 
approach, which requires clear and convincing or 
substantial evidence. Instead, the Court, based on 
Federal, Evidence Rule 104(b), adopted a prima facie 
evidence standard. The Court explained: 
In determining whether the Government has introduced 
sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), the trial court 
neither weighs credibility nor makes a finding that the 
Government has proved the conditional fact [stolen TVs] 
by a preponderance of the evidence. The court simply 
examines all the evidence in the case and decides 
whether the jury could reasonably find the conditional 
fact- here, that the televisions were stolen - by a 
preponderance of the evidence. /d. at 690. 
This ruling applies only to federal trials. 
Disputed Issues 
· Even if "other acts" evidence is probative of an essen-
tial element of the charged offense, the evidence is not 
admissible unless that element is a disputed issue in the 
case. See 22 Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and 
Procedure 489-90 (1979). For example, as noted above, 
evidence of "other acts" that shows motive may be rele-
vant to the issue of identity. If, however, the defendant 
admits the act but claims self-defense, identity is not an 
issue in the case, and the evidence should be excluded 
because its prejudicial effect will outweigh the need for 
the evidence under Rule 403(A). See State v. Snowden, 
49 Ohio App.2d 7, 13, 359 N.E.2d 87, 92 (1976). 
In State v. Eubank, 60 Ohio St.2d 183, 298 N.E.2d 567 
(1979), the state argued the admissibility of evidence of 
"other acts" on the theory that such evidence showed an 
absence of mistake or accident. The Supreme Court held 
admission was error because "[m]istake or accident was 
not a material issue." /d. at 186. See a/so State v. C\,Jrry, 
43 Ohio St:2d66,-73; 330 NE2d 720, 726 (1975) ("In the 
present appeal, identity was not a material issue."). 
Frequently a stipulation will eliminate an issue from 
dispute and thuspreclude the need for "other acts" evi-
dence. See United States v. Mohel, 604 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 
1979); United States v. DeVaughn, 601 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 
1979); United States v. Williams, 577 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 
1978), cert denied, 439 U.S. 868 (1978) ("[o]ther crimes 
evidence is inadmissible to prove intent when that issue 
is not really in dispute."). 
Balancing Probative Value Against Unfair Prejudice 
Rul€l4Q3(A) provides th~t relevant evidence must be 
excluded if its probative value Is substantially outweighed 
by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, or 
misleading the jury. The decision to admit evidence of 
other acts is subject to Rule 403. The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note t() Federal Rule 404(b) states: "No mechanical 
solution is offered. The determination must be made 
whether the danger of undue prejudice outweighs the 
probative value of the evidence in view of the availability 
of other means of proof and other factors appropriate for 
making deCisions of this kind under Rule 403." 
Evidence of other acts presents all three of the dangers 
specified in Rule 403(A), but especially the danger of un-
fair prejudice, because the jury may use the evidence for 
the impermissible purpose of determining character. Rule 
403(A), by requiring that unfair prejudice substantially 
outweigh probative value before exclusion is required, 
manifests a bias in favor of admissibility. 
TheO!Jio cases, however, demonstrate. a bias against 
admissibility. In State v. Lytle, 48 Ohio St.2d 391, 358 
N .E.2d 623.(1976), vacated_oo_gth~LgiQIJ.nds, 438 U.S. 
910 (1978), the Supreme Court required thai Hie'evli::iemce 
of "other acts" be "substantially" relevant for some pur-
pose other than to show a probability that the individual 
committed the crime on trial because he is a man of 
criminal character. /d. at 402; accord, State v. Hector, 19 
Ohio St.2d 167, 249 N.E.2d 912 (1969). The prior cases 
should control because the Staff Notes to Rules 403 and 
404 indicate that these rules are not intended to change 
the existing law. See a/so Rule 102. 
Double Jeopardy and Collateral Estoppel 
In Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342 (1990), the 
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U.S. SUpreme Court considered the admissibility of 
"other acts" evidence under Federal Rule 404(b) in 
cases in which the accused had been acquitted of the 
prior crime. The defendant objected on double jeopardy 
and due process grounds. The double jeopardy argu-
ment focused on the collateral estoppel rule. 
Accordillgto the Court, the prior acquittal meant only 
that the prosecution had failed to establish the defendant's 
guilt of the prior crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
standard of admissibility for evidence of other crimes is 
far less demanding. The prosecution in a federal trial 
need only introduce evidence from which the jury could 
reasonaoly-coi"iclUCIEHhat the accused had committed 
theip~ior act. Thus, collateral estoppel did not apply. In 
addition, tile Court found nothing fundamentally unfair 
about introducing such evidence. 
Entrapment 
Ohio follows the majority rulE! on entrapment, some-
times known as the "origin of intent" test. See LaFave & 
Scott, Criminal Law 5.2 (2d ed. 1986). Under this test, 
entrapment occurs "when the criminal design originates 
with the officials of the Government, and they implant in 
the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit 
the alleged off!=Jnse and induce its commission in order 
that they may prosecute." Sorrells v. United States, 287 
U.S. 435, 442 (1932). See a/so United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. 423 (1973); Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 
369 (1958); Ohio Jury Instructions§ 411.25 (entrapment). 
Under this view of entrapment, the question of the 
defendant's predisposition (propensity) is a material 
issue~ and the aefendant's prior criminal conduct 
becomes relevant. As the Supreme Court has stated, 
"if the defendant seeks acquittal by reason of entrap-
menrne_"Caiinorcorrfplain of an appropriate and search-
. ing inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition as 
bearing upon the issue." Sorrells v. United States, supra, 
at 451. 
Thus, an entrapment defense necessarily raises 
issues concerning the defendant's character and 
commission of "other acts." Although the commentators 
disagree on the theory of the entrapment defense, they 
do agree that the Federal Rules of Evidence have not 
changed the J:>rior law on the subject. See 2 Louise II & 
Mueller, Federal Evidence 129~33 (1978); 22 Wright & 
Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure 372-79 (1978). 
